Indonesia Law Review

Volume 13 | Number 2 Article 1

8-31-2023

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Indonesia Law Review (2023) 2: 71 - 88
ISSN: 2088-8430 | e-ISSN: 2356-2129

MORALITY IN LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND INDONESIA NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

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Article Info

Received : 3 April 2023 | Received in revised form : 5 June 2023 | Accepted : 15 August 2023
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Abstract

This study investigates the moral position according to naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism perspectives along with the adjustment of the positivist view of morality within the law; and the moral position in Indonesia's national legal system as every country has its own legal reasoning pattern about morality in the law. The content of this paper is analyzed using qualitative methods and secondary data analysis. normative juridical legal research method. ***The result shows*** *that each perspective, whether it is naturalism, positivism, or interpretivism, has its own argument on how morality is established; why it is important to incorporate morality in the law, and what legal goals they must uphold; and Indonesia's reasoning pattern exhibits the combination of multiple philosophies of law schools characteristics.* ***The conclusion is*** *that the position of morality in Indonesia has a similarity to naturalism and interpretivism because from the very beginning of the law-making process up to the implementation, Indonesia can not separate morality from the law.*

Keywords*: Morality, Law, Legal Philosophy, Indonesia National Legal System, Naturalism, Positivism, Interpretivism.*

Abstrak

Penelitian ini mengindentifikasi kedudukan moral menurut perspektif naturalisme, positivisme serta penyesuaian pandangan positivisme dalam moralitas hukum; dan kedudukan moral dalam sistem hukum nasional Indonesia karena setiap negara memiliki pola penalaran hukumnya sendiri tentang moral dalam hukum. Isi artikel ini dianalisis dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif dan data sekunder dalam menganalisisnya. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa: setiap naturalisme, positivisme, atau interpretivisme memiliki argumentasinya sendiri tentang bagaimana moral ditemukan, mengapa moral penting untuk dimasukan ke dalam hukum, dan tujuan hukum apa yang paling mereka junjung tinggi; dan Pola penalaran Indonesia memperlihatkan perpaduan beberapa ciri aliran filsafat hukum.Kesimpulan didapatkan kedudukan moral di Indonesia sendiri, memiliki kemiripan dengan naturalisme karena sejak awal proses pembuatan hukum hingga pelaksanaannya, Indonesia tidak dapat memisahkan moral dari hukum.

Keywords*: Moralitas, Hukum, Filsafat Hukum, Sistem Hukum Indonesia*

DOI : https://doi.org/10.15742/ilrev.v13n1.1

I. INTRODUCTION

Law and morality are classic discussion topics regarding the essence of law that fills the academic spaces, lawmaking processes, and law enforcement activities. Despite the number of discussions about this topic, the jurisprudence still unsuccessfully explicates the separation of morality as a non-legal matter with the law itself, thus leaving the discussion of this topic to the philosophy of law as mater scientiarum (the mother of jurisprudence).[1] Philosophy of law will then examine the position of morals and law through various schools of philosophy. Each school of philosophy provides the characteristics of reasonings and thoughts of its adherents in solving legal problems faced at different times and places.[2] Understanding these schools of philosophy guides people to an integral and holistic resolution of legal philosophy problems, including the existence and position of morals in law.[3]

Although the dichotomy of legal and moral positions as the naturalists and positivists believed still exists today, at this time, it is almost impossible to just hold on to one side of them wholly. Accordingly, this paper will study the moral position within the law in 3 (three) philosophies of law school, namely: naturalism, positivism, and legal intepretivism. Each of these philosophies has its own perspective about the moral position in the law. These perspectives are intriguing to comprehend as they show the models of legal reasoning that will be used in legal practice, such as the formulation and enforcement of the law. This is just as John Finnis said:

> *"The philosophy of law identifies the grounds for accepting 'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations as appropriate (just) and authoritative, along with the grounds for judging appropriate and authoritative the different kinds of private and public lawmaking and rights-affecting acts (juridical acts) such as contracts, constitutions, legislative enactments, customs, judicial decisions, and the like".*[4]

The reasoning models of legal philosophy that affect every legal product can also be recognized in Indonesia's national legal system. The national legal system of Indonesia has its own outlook on the recognition and moral position in the law. The novelty in this paper is able to show that the legal system in Indonesia considers the moral system, this can be inferred morally from the philosophical foundation of Pancasila

The research problems of this paper are:

1. The position of morals in the law according to naturalism, positivism, constructivism, and interpretivism;
2. The moral position in the Indonesian national legal system.

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[1] Darji Darmodiharjo dan Shidarta, *Fundamentals of Legal Philosophy: What and How is Indonesian Legal Philosophy*, 6th edition, Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2006, p. xi-xii.

[2] Teguh Prasetyo dan Abdul Hakim Barakatullah, *Philosophy, Theory and Legal Studies (Thoughts Towards a Just and Dignified Society)*, Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2013, p. 90.

[3] Darmodiharjo dan Shidarta, *Fundamentals of Legal Philosophy: What and How is Indonesian Legal Philosophy, p.* xii. Book or journal?

[4] John Finnis, "What is the Philosophy of Law", *The American Journal of Jurisprudence* 59, No. 2 (2014): p. 134.

II. DISCUSSION

1. The Position of Morals in The Law According to Naturalism, Positivism, And Interpretivism.

Some of the main schools of philosophy are naturalism, utilitarianism, positivism, the historical school of jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, realism, and critical legal studies.[5] Among these main philosophies of law schools, the debate on the position of law and morals is the strongest between 'naturalism' and 'positivism' due to the contrasting beliefs of their adherents about morals within the law. For instance, Martin P. Golding mentions, "The principles of natural law are a meeting ground for law and morality",[6] therefore it is ascertained that naturalist believes there is an essential connection between law and morality.[7] On the other side, John Austin, as one of the positivists states, "The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one inquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different inquiry".[8] This statement shows how the positivist believes in a strict separation of morals and law.[9]

Paul Scholten says while the law is in place, it remains to be found (*Het recht is er, doch het moet worden gevonden*).[10] As mentioned above, the philosophy of law school is a basic belief or worldview[11] that will help its adherents find the formulation of the law because they offer guidance to the adherents on how a legal question is seen, understood, and answered. Each philosophy of law school guides in finding the law through inquiries related to the essence of law (ontological aspect), the method of legal reasoning (epistemological aspect), and the purpose of the legal reasoning activity (axiological aspect).[12] The discussions on the views of naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism will also be carried out by looking at the three aspects above along with one of the leading experts' opinions from each of these schools to see the models of reasoning in placing moral values in law.

Firstly, naturalism. The perspectives of naturalism are represented by several figures as follows:

1. Plato: He believed in objective forms of justice and goodness implies an objective normative standard. Laws that did not fall within the limits of an objective standard (in Plato's view, the "good of the whole state") were not really laws at all.[13]
2. Cicero: He identified that any natural law philosophy has three main components,

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[5] Telly Sumbu, Ralfie Pinasang, dan Frans Maramis, *Legal Philosophy Textbook,* Manado: Universitas Sam Ratulangi, 2016, p. 8.

[6] Martin P. Golding, *Philosophy of Law*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975. P. 33.

[7] Jeffrie G. Murphy dan Jules L. Coleman, *Philosophy of Law an Introduction to Jurisprudence*, London: Westview Press, 1990, p. 11.

[8] Leslie Green and Thomas Adams, "Legal Positivism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legal-positivism/>.

[9] Achmad Ali, *Revealing Legal Theory and Judicial Theory (Judicialprudence) Including the Interpretation of Laws (Legisprudence)*, Jakarta: Prenada Media Group, 2012, p. 49.

[10] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, Yogyakarta: Genta Publishing, 2013, p. 188.

[11] ERLYN INDARTI, "Discretion and Paradigm: A Study of Legal Philosophy", *Inauguration Speech of Professor in Philosophy of Law at the Faculty of Law, Diponegoro University,* Semarang, 4 November 2010, p. 5.

[12] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, 146, 155, p. 180.

[13] Donald R. McConnell. (2008) "The Nature in Natural Law," *Liberty University Law Review*: Vol. 2: Iss. 3, Article 8.

those are: true law is a right reason in agreement with nature, it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; either an attempt to alter or repeal or abolish this law is a sin; and God is the author, promulgator, and enforcing judge of this law. Cicero underlines the universality and immutability of natural law, its standing as a 'higher' law, and its discoverability by reason (in this sense 'natural').[14]

3. Aristotle: He asserts that there are certain actions that are essentially wrong or unjust such as the acts of murder, theft, and adultery, thus simply to do any of them is to go wrong. In Aristotle's view, the laws that forbid the performance of these actions are valid for all societies and times, so that is why they can be said to be 'natural' laws. These laws ought to be incorporated within the law system of all societies everywhere.[15]

As represented by some figures above, since thousands of years ago, the idea of natural law has emerged as a manifestation of human efforts to yearn for a higher law than positive law, that is, to seek absolute justice. At one time, the ideas of natural law reached their peak, while at other times, they were also ignored.[16] Nevertheless, the existence of natural law that is rooted in the human heart prevails universally and eternally.[17] This background of natural law schools causes the **ontology** aspect of naturalism to be placed at a very abstract level, whereas law is interpreted as principles (especially truth and justice) rather than norms.[18] This interpretation of the law as principles of truth and justice is encouraged by idealism that the idea of truth and justice does not come from experience but precedes experience (apriori not aposteriori) thus, this original and foremost value must be maintained and incorporated in every legal form.[19]

Based on the legal ontology above, the **epistemology** of natural law school applies intuitive-deductive reasoning[20]. The pattern of intuitive-deductive reasoning is illustrated in naturalism by seeing the highest level of law (eternal law) as an activity of intellectual intuition (originating from God) and at the lower level of law being replaced by sensible intuition (things that are visible to the human senses). Hence, moral values in the abstract dimension of intellectual intuition must become the basis for formulating specific lower rules that are visible and practical. Dworkin defines this characteristic by saying, "Natural law is a theory which makes the content of law depend on the correct answer to some moral question".[21] This legal reasoning pattern of naturalism is similar to moral reasoning,[22] which is a method of reasoning that requires the determination of 'what one ought to do' in concrete rules are carried out on moral considerations such as what is morally right, good or bad, just or unjust, fair

[14] Raymond Wacks, *Philosophy of Law, A Very Short Introduction,* New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2006, p. 3-5.
[15] Tony Burns, *Aristotle and Natural Law,* London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011, p. 5.
[16] Emil El Faisal dan Mariyani, *Legal Philosophy Textbook,* Palembang: Bening Media Publishing, 2020, 54.
[17] Helmanida, "School of Natural Law in Legal Philosophy", *Jurnal Simbur Cahaya 44,* XVI (2011), p. 2316.
[18] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots, p.* 16.
[19] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, p. 189.
[20] Deductive is a way of thinking that starts from an assumption or general statement to reach a more specific conclusion. (see Imron Mustofa, "Window of Logic in Thinking: Deduction and Induction as the Basis of Scientific Reasoning", *Jurnal El-Banat* 6, No. 2 (2016), p. 133).
[21] Aisha U-K Umaru, "On the Place of Morality within Natural Law: A Critical Examination of John Finnis' Divergence from Traditional Natural Law Theory in Natural Law and Natural Rights", ResearchGate, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339365814.
[22] Shidarta*, The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, p. 189.

or unfair, honest or dishonest, nice or not nice, and so on.[23]

According to the explanation of ontology and epistemology aspect above, it must be clearly seen that the **axiology** aspect of naturalism has placed the value of justice as the objective of law that should be attained.[24] Naturalism rest assured that the justice value must not be eliminated even though there will be born a man-made law at the most concrete level. If the soul of positive law does not comprise the truth and justice value, then the law is considered an unjust law and what is unjust can not be called a law.[25] So, referring to the ontology, epistemology, and axiology aspect above, it can be suggested that naturalism acknowledge the importance of moral value within the law.

Secondly, the positivism. Contrary to naturalism, positivism argues that the moral and principle of law are only guidelines to be heeded for the formulation of the law, but if a legal product turns out to contradict the moral value, then the legal product is still valid.[26] There are two positivist points of view: analytical jurisprudence which is put forward by John Austin dan the pure theory of law put forward by Hans Kelsen. From John Austin's standpoint, the law is a command set, either directly or circuitously, by a sovereign individual or body, to a member or members of some independent political society in which his authority is supreme.[27]

"**Austin stressed that the subject matter of jurisprudence is positive law, or law strictly so called, which he described as the express or tacit commands of the sovereign. This supreme and legally illimitable power is the ultimate source of every legal rule in an independent political society. Austin acknowledged that subordinate officials (such as judges) make law, but he emphasized that they do so at the pleasure of the sovereign. The sovereign is identifiable, he argued, by two characteristics: habitual obedience from the bulk of the population, and habitual noncompliance with the commands of any other human superior**".

Meanwhile from Kelsen's standpoint:[28]

> *"Law is a normative phenomenon, and as such it must be carefully distinguished from factual phenomena and other normative phenomena. Law must be understood as it is not as it ought to be. Since this is so, legal scholars can invoke neither (i) empirical considerations from psychology, sociology, economics, political science, etc., nor (ii) normative considerations from ethics, theology, etc., in their analyses of the law. In keeping with the is/ought distinction, the validity of a given legal norm can only be explained by reference to the validity of another and higher legal norm. A structure of norms of different levels where norms on a higher level authorize the creation of norms on a lower level is described as 'Stufenbau'".*

[23] Gilbert Harman, "Moral Reasoning", Princeton University Papers, Available at ~~https://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Moral_Reasoning_Current.pdf. The requested URL /~harman/Papers/Moral_Reasoning_Current.pdf was not found on this server.~~

[24] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, p. 193.

[25] Dennis Patterson (*Ed.*), *A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory*, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers, 1999, p. 226.

[26] Sukarno Aburaera, *Theoretical and Practical Legal Philosophy,* Jakarta: Kencana, 2013, p. 107.

[27] Ali, *Revealing Legal Theory and Judicial Theory (Judicialprudence) Including the Interpretation of Laws (Legisprudence)*, p. 56.

[28] Torben Spaak, "Kelsen and Hart on the Normative of Law", *Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law 1957-2010*, p. 402-403.

Furthermore, Stfenbau's theory involves a legal system that is a ladder system with tiered rules, where the lowest legal norms must adhere to higher legal norms and the highest legal norms (constitution) must adhere to the most basic legal norms (grundnorm) which are usually abstract.

Although Austin and Kelsen have their own notion of positivism, there is a similarity in the **ontology** aspect of their positivism characteristic that law is merely a positive legal norm.[29] The reasoning pattern employed in the positivist **epistemology** is doctrinal-deductive, whereby the abstract legal rules will be the cornerstone of validity tests in legal studies. Consequently, higher rules, legal concepts, and doctrines as abstract legal rules will be the reference of the validity test.[30] From the explanation of ontology and epistemology aspects above, the positivist **axiology** aspect regards legal certainty as the objective of the law. The positivist perceives that the legal certainty value will be materialized if there is a formal source of law in legislation.[31] Based on the ontology, epistemology, and axiology aspects previously mentioned, it can be concluded that positivism separates morality and law firmly, though it does not deny the existence of morals surrounding the law.

The positivist stand which does not deny morality can also be seen in H. L. A. Hart's statement. In Hart's point of view, law has to be separated from non-law elements such as morals, history, social facts, and so forth. Nevertheless, when it comes to the connection between law and morality, he also argues that there is a 'necessary' connection between law and morality. However, the connection happens as a 'natural' contingent necessity of human beings. Hence, the legal systems contain rules that prohibit murder, theft, violence, protection of property, etc., and through the general characteristic of rules in the legal system, there can be found the element of justice and the notion of 'treating like cases alike'. These two elements are considered moral values which overlap with all legal rules. Further, Hart is known for the idea of 'soft positivism' which is the positivism that allows moral criterion as one of legal validity factors.[32] In his elaboration, Hart mentions that there are primary rules (the rules that govern our actions) and secondary rules or rules of recognition (the rules that determine which primary rules are binding) in the law. If the law wishes to be recognized as a law by society, making just the primary rules is not enough. It is the rules of recognition containing the society's ultimate criteria for what counts as a law that the lawmakers must consider so that society accepts the formulation as a law.[33]

Thirdly, the interpretivism. This philosophy of law schools emanates from Dworkin's response to Hart and Hart Proponent's argument. Shapiro said the Hart-Dworkin debate is basically looking for the answers to legal questions: "Should law be understood to consist in those standards socially designated as authoritative? Or is it constituted by those standards morally designated as authoritative? Are the ultimate determinants of law social facts alone or moral facts as well?".[34] Dworkin

[29] Pratama Herry Herlambang, "Positivism and Its Implications for Science and Law Enforcement", *State Law Review* 2, No. 1 (2019), p. 108.

[30] Soetandyo Wignjosoebroto, *Law: Paradigms, Methods and Problems,* Jakarta: ELSAM dan HUMA, 2002, in Muhammad Helmy Hakim, "Shifting Orientation of Legal Research: From Doctrinal to Socio-Legal", *Jurnal Syariah* 16, No. 2 (2016), p. 107.

[31] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, p. 200.

[32] Jason C. Glahn, "Is Hard Positivism too Hard to Swallow", *North Dakota Law Review* 3 (2006): p. 7.

[33] Caroline Stromberg, "Legal Positivism and The Use of Ethics in Legal Interpretation in A Swedish Case", *XXVII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy* (2015), p. 5.

[34] Scott J. Shapiro, "The 'Hart-Dworkin' Debate: A Short Guide for The Perplexed", *Public Law and Legal*

himself answers that lawmaking should be based on moral standards accepted by society, which is quite similar to Hart's soft positivism. What differs between Hart and Dworkin's argument is that from the very beginning, Dworkin, as an interpretivist, believes, "The law and legal practice are, by their very nature, interpretative concepts and moral phenomenon[35]". Dworkin as the initiator of interpretivism comprehends that legal construction in its entirety has purposes and meanings. Thus the law practice, especially the adjudication, must become the medium to seek the purpose and meaning of the law.[36] The purpose and meaning of law will be found by practicing constructive interpretation, and if the rules as they exist now do not per se serve underlying interests, purposes[37], or principles, thus they must be interpreted differently.[38] Roughly speaking, the final goal of interpretation is to place the practice 'in the better light'.[39] To place the practice in a better light relies on what the interpreter thinks is best, meaning it is ultimately an instance of moral interpretation, it is all about the value all the way down.[40]

In Dworkin's view, the interpretation of the law is always an activity of interpreting based on moral values, primarily 'justice' as the main principle in the life of society. He stated, "A law must be assessed for its suitability with justice, and even the interpretation of the text of the law must also be based on the value of justice".[41] What Dworkin means by 'justice' is treating others properly.[42] Although, besides interpreting based on the value of justice, Dworkin also wants the legal judgment to be seen as an aesthetic object built on harmonious principles such as equality or honesty.[43] This is absolutely why Dworkin insists that law is beyond rules because there are principles within it. In order to embody a better practice, Dworkin mentions there will be three stages of interpretation, those are:[44]

1. The pre-interpretative stage: the stage where the rules and standards that form part of the practice to be interpreted have to be listed;
2. The subsequent interpretative stage: the stage where the interpreter has to settle on a general justification for the main elements of the practice that have been identified;

Theory Working Paper Series 77 (2007), p. 18.

[35] Nicos Stavropoulos, "Essays The Debate That Never Was. Harvard Law Review", available at https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2082-2095_ Hukum sebagai Interpretasi Stavropoulos_Online.pdf.

[36] Petrus CKL Bello, "Law as Interpretation", *Diskursus* 11, No. 1 (2012), p. 63.

[37] Dworkin explains that "the purpose of statutory interpretation very briefly in the abstract: the practice aims to make the governance of the pertinent community fairer, wiser, and more just. That description fits what lawyers and judges do when they interpret statutes; it justifies that practice, in a general way, and it suggests, also in a very general way, what standards are appropriate for deciding which interpretation of a particular statute is most successful". (see Lawrence B. Solum, "The Unity of Interpretation", *Boston University Law Review* 90, p. 559).

[38] Fanny de Graaf, "Dworkin's Constructive Interpretation as a Method of Legal Research", Boom Juridisch, available at https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2015/12/lawandmethod-D-14-00004.pdf,

[39] Lisa Van Alstyne, "Theory, Interpretation, and Law: Some Worries about Dworkin's Account of Their Relation", *Philosophical Topics* 44, No. 1 (2016), p. 265.

[40] Allison W. Scott, "Legal Interpretation: Taking Words Seriously", *CMC Senior Theses Paper* (2011), p. 42.

[41] Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Right Seriously,* London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, p. 121.

[42] Ronald Dworkin, *Justice for Hedgehogs,* Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2011, p. 13.

[43] Urbanus Ura Weruin, "Legal Hermeneutics: Principles and Rules of Legal Interpretation", *Jurnal Konstitusi* 13, No. 1 (2016), p. 102.

[44] Graaf, "Dworkin's Constructive Interpretation as a Method of Legal Research", p. 3.

3. The post-interpretative stage: the stage the interpreter applies critical reflection about 'how does the rule really have to be interpreted to better serve the justification found in the previous stage?'.

These interpretation stages have to be implemented in every concrete legal case so that each of the cases will get 'fresh moral judgments'. It is just as what Dworkin said in his opinion about constitution interpretation, "lawyers and judges, in the day-to-day work, instinctively treat the constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be applied to concrete cases through fresh moral judgments."[45]

Through the explanation of interpretivism characteristic above, the **ontology** aspect of interpretivism evinces that law is interpreted as principles, values, and purposes dug by the interpreter. The ontology aspect of this interpretivism is similar to the ontology aspect of natural law because as mentioned by Shidarta, Dworkin's opinion is a new variant of naturalism proponent who wants to test the validity of human-made legal products based on a moral criterion.[46] Next, the **epistemology** aspect of interpretivism is a combination of doctrinal deductive and non-doctrinal inductive, whereas the interpreter must be able to analyze the legal provisions and the phenomena in practice to determine the most appropriate rules to be applied. Finally, the **axiology** aspect of interpretivism puts the value of justice and utility as the objective of law because interpretivism believes the law should make the practice better.

All of the discussion above can be summarized in the table below:

Table 1: Summary of Moral Position in Naturalism, Positivism, and Interpretivism based on Ontology, Epistemology, and Axiology Perspective.

Philosophy of Law Schools	Ontology	Epistemology	Axiology	Position of Morals in The Law
Naturalism	The essence of law is the principle of justice and truth. Law as what ought to be in moral or ideal precepts	Doctrinal Deductive	Justice	● Moral and law can not be separated. ● Morals are recognized since the beginning of the lawmaking process. ● Moral values are abstract knowledge from God and other sources beyond a human sense that live eternally in the human mind. These moral values should be settled in man-made law. Otherwise, the law can not be called law.

[45] Ronald Dworkin, *Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 3.

[46] Shidarta, *The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots*, p. 189-190.

Positivism	Law is merely a positive legal norm. Or known as Law as what is written in the books	Doctrinal deductive	Certainty of law	● Moral and law should be separated. ● The moral values are recognized but must be separated, meaning if the law does not include moral values, then it is still a valid law. ● Moral values can be recognized in the lawmaking process because: there is a universal basic need of human that indirectly represent moral values and there is a rule of recognition whereby if the rule wants to be approved as a rule by society then it must conform the moral value upheld by the society.
Interpretivism	Law as interpretations or processes of interpreting	Doctrinal Deductive and Nondoctrinal Inductive	Justice and Utility	● Moral and law can not be separated. ● Morals are recognized from the beginning of the lawmaking process to the implementation of the rules. ● The moral values can be found through the interpretation of interpreters in the form of a court decision, new legislation, lawsuit application, and so on.

Source: Authors' discussion above.

Table 2 simply depicts that either naturalism, positivism, or interpretivism has its own argument on how morals are found and why morals are essential to be incorporated in the law. However, it is noteworthy that no school can refuse the importance of morals in the law.

2. The Position Of Morality in Indonesia's National Legal System

A legal system is a unit consisting of the spirit of the nation component; the structural component; the substantial component; and the legal culture component which functionally connect each other to achieve certain goals.[47] In Indonesia, all of the components mentioned before are established by the lodestar of Indonesia's national spirit embodied in 'Pancasila'. Pancasila is a set of values that is discovered in Indonesian personality and culture in everyday life. The content of Pancasila consists of five principles, among others:

1. Belief in one and only God;
2. Just and civilized humanity;
3. Unity of Indonesia;
4. Democracy led by the wisdom of people representatives; dan
5. Social justice for all Indonesian people.

The Pancasila with five principles provides direction and goals to be taken where the Indonesian nation and state are, including inspiring the legal system in Indonesia. The Pancasila principles have reflected the recognition of morals and the ideals of the Indonesian people. The founding fathers hoped Pancasila would be used as the fundamental basis for the implementation of various state activities and affairs in

[47] Paisol Burlian, *Legal System in Indonesia,* Palembang: Fakultas Dakwah dan Komunikasi UIN Raden Fatah, 2015, p. 1-2.

Indonesia.[48] The founding father's will to make Pancasila as the basis of the state can be found in the fourth paragraph of the Indonesia Constitution year 1945 Preamble, which states:

> *"[...] the national independence of Indonesia shall be formulated into a constitution of the sovereign Republic of Indonesia which is* **based on** *the belief in the One and Only God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy led by the wisdom of people representatives and the realization of social justice for all Indonesia people."*

The words "[...] based on [...]" in the fourth paragraph cited above show the intention of Indonesia to assign Pancasila as an absolute principle of Indonesia's legal order that must be realized in Indonesia's state administration.[49] According to Notonagoro, this position of Pancasila posits it as the basis of state philosophy (*philosofische grondslag*), which becomes the source of all law sources.[50]

One of the consequences of Pancasila as a state philosophy basis that becomes the source of all law sources is that Pancasila must be concretized in the various legal products in Indonesia. Shidarta says the ideal reasoning model for contextualizing Pancasila principles in Indonesia legal products is as follows:

Table 2: The Ideal Reasoning Model to Contextualize Pancasila Principles In Indonesia Legal Product By Shidarta.

Perspective	Explanation
Ontology	The suitable legal reasoning pattern regarding the Indonesian situation is when the law is interpreted as a positive legal norm. The reason is that it is consistent with the civil law legal system adopted by Indonesia, and it is aimed to avoid the disregard of the law either by the enforcers or those who have to obey the law.
Epistemology	Intuitive deductive and empirical (simultaneously) doctrinal deductive. The pattern of reasoning in the legal product's formulation starts from a simultaneous intuitive-deductive and empirical approach, whereas the legislators will examine religious provisions or Pancasila principles that can be found in the Indonesian people's lives, then formulate them in the written rules afterward. Meanwhile, the pattern of reasoning carried out by judges also shows the same characteristic, whereby there is a process of back-and-forth analysis between facts-rules and rules-system of rules called the context of the discovery process and then ends with the judge's judgment or so-called context of justification.
Axiology	The pattern of legal reasoning in accordance with Indonesian legal ideals placed the value of justice and utility simultaneously and subsequently followed by the value of legal certainty.

Source: Shidarta, The Law of Reason and Legal Reasoning: Book 1 Philosophical Roots, 395, 408, 411, 434, 435.

[48] Seno Wibowo Gumbira, I Gusti Ayu Ketut Rachmi Handayani, and Kukuh Tejomurti, "The Urgency of Presidential Policy to Revitalize and Maintain the Existence of Cooperatives Based on Pancasila", *Sriwijaya Law Review* 3, Issue 2 (2019): p. 200.

[49] Kaelan, *Pancasila National State: Cultural, Historical, Philosophical, Juridical, and Its Actualization,* Yogyakarta: Paradigma, 2013, p. 52.

[50] Kaelan, *Pancasila National State: Cultural, Historical, Philosophical, Juridical, and Its Actualization, p.* 50-51.

Table 2 above shows that Indonesia also values morals within the law, although at some points the reasoning patterns are slightly different from naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism (compare it with Table 1). Interestingly, despite the distinctions, Indonesia's reasoning pattern exhibits the combination of multiple philosophies of law school characteristics, which will be further explicated in Table 3 below:

Table 3: The Similarity of Ontology, Epistemology, Axiology Perspective, or Moral Position Among Naturalism, Positivism, Interpretivism, and Indonesia Legal Reasoning.

Perspective	Explanations
Ontology	It is similar to positivism because the law is best seen as a positive legal norm.
Epistemology	It is similar to interpretivism because the legal products (legislation and/or court decision) are done by back-and-forth analysis between fact-rules and rules-system.
Axiology	It is a combination of naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism axiology perspectives because the ultimate goals of Indonesian law are to realize justice, utility, and legal certainty.
Position of Morals in The Law	It is similar to naturalism and interpretivism because morality and law can not be separated. It must be incorporated from the law-making process up to the law implementation

Source: Authors' discussion above.

In regards to the explanation in Table 4 above, there are some examples to better comprehend Indonesia's legal reasoning and how Indonesia incorporates moral values in the law-making process up to the law interpretation. Firstly, in the Indonesia law-making process as explained in table 4 below.

Table 4: The Evidence of Indonesia's Legal Reasoning in the Law-Making Process.

Perspective	Explanations	Evidence
Ontology	It is similar to positivism because the law is best seen as a positive legal norm.	There are some Articles in the Indonesia Constitution that state the arrangement of positive legal norms, among others: a. Article 5 (2) of the Indonesia Constitution, "The President may issue Government regulations as required to implement **laws**" b. Article 25 of the Indonesia Constitution, "The appointment and dismissal of judges shall be regulated by **law**" c. Article 26 (1) of the Indonesian Constitution, "Citizens shall consist of indigenous Indonesian peoples and persons of foreign origin who have been legalized as citizens in accordance with **law**". d. Article 28J of the Indonesian Constitution states, "In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept the restrictions established by **law** for the sole purposes of guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society"

Epistemology	It is similar to interpretivism because the legal products (legislation and/or court decision) are created by back-and-forth analysis between fact-rules and rules-system.	There are guidelines that require the legislator to do comprehensive research and review before issuing the legislation, such as: a. the Annex II page 11, Law number 12 of 2011 jo. Law number 15 of 2019 on The Establishment of Legislations (hereinafter The Establishment of Legislations Law) stated that the main ideas in the law, provincial regulation, or regency/municipal regulation consideration must contain, among others: 1) Philosophical background It outlines that the regulations consider the way of life, legal awareness, and ideas, including the psychological condition and philosophy of the Indonesian nation under Pancasila and the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. 2) Sociological background It outlines that the regulations fulfill the public needs in all aspects. 3) Juridical background It outlines that the regulations are made to address legal issues or fill the legal vacuum by considering the existing rules to be amended or repealed to ensure that legal certainty is upheld and public justice is served. b. Article 11 (2) alphabet h of Presidential Regulation number 87 of 2015 on The Implementing Regulation of The Establishment of Legislations Law (hereinafter The Implementing Regulation of The Establishment of Legislations Law) stated that the preparation of national legislation programs in the form of draft laws or the regulatory framework direction must be based on, one of which, the aspirations of the community c. Article 71 The Implementing Regulation of The Establishment of Legislations Law stated that the preparation of provincial regulations drafts might invite researchers and/or experts from universities or community organizations as needed. Indeed, the presence of this article is to gather more comprehensive research or expert studies on Indonesian society's real social phenomena. d. Article 188 The Implementing Regulation of The Establishment of Legislations Law states that the public has the right to suggest any input or recommendation in the lawmaking process orally or in writing. All of these guidelines are a back-and-forth process between fact rules and the rule system because they not only have to set the rules but also discern the public needs and synchronize all of them with the Indonesian legal system.
Axiology	It is a combination of naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism axiology perspectives because the ultimate goals of Indonesian law are to realize justice, utility, and legal certainty.	There are some guidelines such as: a. The elucidation of Article 2 The Establishment of Legislations Law stated: "[...] Placing Pancasila as the basis and ideology of the state as well as the philosophical basis of the state so that any material contained in the laws and regulations must not conflict with the values contained in Pancasila."; b. Article 6 paragraph (1) of The Establishment of Legislations Law stated that the material content of Indonesia legislation must reflect the following principles, among others: 1) protection; 2) humanity; 3) nationality; 4) brotherhood; 5) archipelagic nationhood; 6) unity in diversity; 7) justice; 8) equality before the law and in the government; 9) legal order and certainty; and/or 10)balance, orderliness, and harmony.

Source: summarized based on various sources.

Secondly, the implementation of law in Indonesia. In this case, which will be elaborated in Table 5 below. Table 5 mainly delineates the example of law implementation in a judge's interpretation and decision.

Table 5: The Evidence of Indonesia's Legal Reasoning in the Implementation of Law.

Perspective	Explanations	Evidence
Ontology	It is similar to positivism because the law is best seen as a positive legal norm.	Article 1 paragraph (1) Law number 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power (hereinafter Judicial Power Law) stated: "The judicial power is an independent power of the state to organize the judiciary process in order to enforce the law and justice based on Pancasila and Indonesia Constitution year 1945 [...]";
Epistemology	It is similar to interpretivism because the legal products (legislation and/or court decision) are created by back-and-forth analysis between fact-rules and rules-system.	Article 5 paragraph (1) of The Judicial Power Law stated, "The constitutional judges and judges are obliged to explore, follow, and understand the legal values and sense of justice that live in a society".
Axiology	It is a combination of naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism axiology perspectives because the ultimate goals of Indonesian law are to realize justice, utility, and legal certainty.	Article 2 paragraph (1) of The Judicial Power Law stated, "The judiciary process is done 'For The Sake of Justice and The Almighty God'". Therefore the phrase 'For Justice and The Almighty God' becomes the title of the court decision.

Source: summarized based on various sources.

The ontology, epistemology, and axiology context could also be seen in judge decisions. Some instances from the constitutional court decisions are as follows:

Table 6: The ontology, epistemology, and axiology of Indonesian Legal Reasoning in several judge decisions.

Quotation	Perspective	Explanation
The Constitutional Court Decision Number 46/ PUU-XIV/2016 about the criminalization of LGBT	**Ontology** It is similar to positivism because the law is best seen as a positive legal norm.	The positive legal norms used here are written in the Indonesian constitution and Indonesian criminal law.
	Epistemology It is similar to interpretivism because the legal products (legislation and/or court decision) are created by back-and-forth analysis between fact-rules and rules-system; and **Axiology** It is a combination of naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism axiology perspectives because the ultimate goals of Indonesian law are to realize justice, utility, and legal certainty.	There is a quotation of Constitutional Court Judges' dissenting opinion that illustrates how the judges consider the rules as well as Indonesian living law to make the decision. This quotation will also show the combination of axiological aspects. The quotation is as cited below: "Based on Article 1 paragraph (3) [...] of the Indonesian constitution, it can be understood that Indonesia is a "legal state based on the One Supreme God [...] and recognizes customary law community units and their traditional rights throughout in accordance with the development of Indonesian society and principles which are regulated in law. This concept emphasizes that legislation in Indonesia must always be in line with [...] religious values and living law [...]. Related to this context, Article 28D paragraph (1) states that one of the constitutional rights of every person is "fair legal certainty", so if there is a legal certainty in a legal norm that reduces, narrows, exceeds, and/or is contrary to the basis of the Supreme God [...] as well as a living law, then it is not a fair legal certainty."

The Constitutional Court Decision Number about the Job Creation Law procedure and content	**Ontology** It is similar to positivism because the law is best seen as a positive legal norm.	In his dissenting opinion, Justice Arief Hidayat stated that Indonesia actually adheres to the mixed system (he means positivist-nonpositivist) which under certain conditions, Indonesia could break the rule to meet the people's needs. In this case, he opined the Job Creation Law which was made using the omnibus method might not have any legal basis in the Establishment of Legislations Law, but it is needed to overcome the overlapping law that causes uncertainty and unfairness.
	Epistemology It is similar to interpretivism because the legal products (legislation and/or court decision) are created by back-and-forth analysis between fact-rules and rules-system; and	There is a quotation from the decision that represents the back-and-forth analysis of the judges to see Indonesian citizens' complaints due to not being able to participate in the law-making process. In the consideration, judges state: "... public participation is guaranteed as a constitutional right in Article [...] Indonesia Constitution. If the legislators in the process and mechanism actually prevent or distance the community from participating in discussions and debating its contents, then the legislators have violated the principle of people's sovereignty".
	Axiology It is a combination of naturalism, positivism, and interpretivism axiology perspectives because the ultimate goals of Indonesian law are to realize justice, utility, and legal certainty.	There is a quotation from the decision that represents the axiology context. The quote is as follows: "The Constitutional Court choice to detemine Law Number 11 Year 2020 regarding Job Creation Law as conditionally unconstitutional is because the Court must balance between the formal requirement for the formulation of law to obtain legal certainty, utility, and justice.".

Source: summarized based on various sources.

III.CONCLUSION

Ultimately, through the explanation above, it can be concluded that : (1) Each naturalism, positivism, or interpretivism has its own argument on how morals are found, why morals are important to be incorporated in the law, and what legal goals they must uphold. Firstly, the naturalists believe that law and morality can not be separated. It is abstract knowledge from other resources beyond the human sense that must be implemented in man-made law. The legal goal to uphold is justice. Secondly, the positivists see the law as merely a positive legal norm. Clearly, morality and law should be separated. The positivist adherents uphold the certainty of law as the goal of the law. Last but not least, the interpretivists see justice and utility as legal goals that must be unearthed by the interpretation process. All of the explanations have been summarized in Table 2. (2) In Indonesia, moral values have been recognized as a fundamental element of every legal product ever since Indonesia declared its independence. The moral values adhered to by Indonesian people are embodied in Pancasila principles and religious values as the basis of state philosophy. Thus, these values must always be incorporated into the lawmaking and judicial judgment process. In regards to concretizing the values in the legal product, Indonesia's reasoning pattern exhibits the combination of multiple philosophies of law school characteristics. Firstly, the ontology aspect is similar to positivism because the law is best seen as a positive legal norm. All of the product and judge decisions must conform with the regulation. Secondly, the epistemology aspect is similar to interpretivism

because of the back-and-forth analysis between fact-rules and rules-system. Lastly, the axiology is a combination of justice, certainty, and utility. The position of morality in Indonesia has a similarity to naturalism and interpretivism because from the very beginning of the law-making process up to the implementation, Indonesia can not separate morality from the law. The summary of conclusion number two has been displayed in Table 3.

We realize that there are still many shortcomings and limitations in the study of morality in law against legal philosophy and the national legal system in Indonesia. We hope that further researchers will explore morality in particular legislation to be studied and developed more deeply.

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